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Europeans and the Steppe: Russian lands under the Mongol Rule 
 
Chapter for Yongjin Zhang, Shogo Suzuki & Joel Quirk (eds.) International orders in the 
Early Modern World: Before the Rise of the West London: Routledge. 
 
Iver B. Neumann ibn@nupi.no 
 
It was endemic on the medieval religious frontier not to admit consciously that 
one had borrowed institutions from conquered or conquering peoples of a 
different religion. This was true of Crusader Valencian 13th-century Spain about 
Islamic Moorish institutions, of the Arab Umayyad dynasty from the 7th century 
or the Ottoman empire from the 14th century about Byzantine institutions, and of 
the French Crusader Kingdom of Jerusalem from the 12th century about Islamic 
institutions (Halperin 2000: 238). 
 
Introduction 
 
The editors write in their introduction to this volume that it was only from around 1750 
onwards that European powers acquired sufficient capacities regularly to dictate terms to 
political communities in many parts of the world. It took that long to muster the capacity 
to project force across the distances in question. Where relations with non-European 
political communities are concerned, however, the turning point came 250 years before, 
in the final decade of the 15th century. This was when the Moors, as well as the Sephardic 
Jews, where suborned and forced to leave Spain (1492). It was also the decade when 
Russians threw off what they in retrospect chose to name the ‘Tatar Yoke’. By 1750, 
Russia was only decades away from annexing the Crimean Khanate, the last of the other 
successor polities of what has anachronistically been called the Golden Horde, but that 
was known at the time as the Khipchak Khanate (Halperin 2000; Morgan 1986: 141).1 
The annexation followed a victorious Russian war against the Ottoman empire. At the 
end of the period covered by this book (1492-1792), then, Russia’s relation with non-
European polities such as the Ottoman Empire and Persia, not to mention relations with 
indigenous peoples throughout Siberia, mirrored the hierarchical relations between 
European and non-European polities discussed in the other chapters. At the beginning of 
the period, however, Russia was emerging from a clearly subaltern relationship with a 
non-European polity, namely the Khipchak Khanate, to which Russian cities were 
suzerain.  
 
The first part of this chapter is basically a reminder of the importance of the steppe not 
only to Russian history, but to European history at large. The Khipchak Khanate was the 
polity – the empire, really (comp. Nexon & Wright 2007) -- to last the longest of those 
that came out of the great Mongol empire which ruled most of the known world in the 
mid 13th century. The Mongol empire was one – it should turn out to be the last one -- of 
a succession of polities that, beginning at the end of the third century of our era, began its 
life cycle in the Altai are in the extreme north-east of the Eurasian continent, only to 
                                                 
1 The ruler of Muscovy, who had taken the title of tsar in 1547, annexed the successor polity of the Khanate 
of Kazan’ in 1552 and the Khanate of Astrakhan in 1556. 
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absorb a number of other Mongol and Turkic nomadic elements. These were to be found 
throughout the steppe which stretched from the Pacific in the south to the forested areas 
at the Dnepr in the west, and being delineated by the taiga in the north and by sedentary 
cultures to the south (principally China, Persia and (West and East) Rome (Barfield 
1989). The second part of the chapter fastens on how Russian cities experienced being 
part of a Mongol polity, and the third part on how the consequent hybridization fed into 
Russia’s entry into international society. The theme of this chapter, then, is the 
experience by a specific sub-set of Christians (we cannot in good faith call them 
Europeans, because this was a concept that was in use briefly during Charlemagne’s reign 
and did not pop up again in the first half of the fifteenth century) of being dominated by 
“non-Europeans”, and how this experience was, in the period of key interest to this 
volume (14292-1792) somehow seen as contaminating by other Europeans . 
 
Note that, as seen from the Khipchak Khanate, the key point of interest was not Russia or 
Europe, but, first, the Mongol imperial centre at Karakorum, and when the centre lost its 
hold towards the end opf the thirteenth century, another of the Mongol empire’s 
successor states, namely the Il-khan empire to their south-east, with which it quarreled 
continuously about tribute-taking in and trade routes  through the Caucasus (more 
below). Mongols were past masters of many things, one of them being to provincialise 
Russia. 
 
The Mongols 
 
The size of the Mongol population at the time of Chinggis Khan has been estimated at 
700.000 (Allsen 1987: 5). Although the Mongol made eminent use of heavy wooden 
saddles and composite bows, their key advantage in warfare was their strategy. The 
Mongols emphasized protracted training, advance planning, multi-strand coordination 
and tight discipline. Alone at the time, they concentrated their thinking not on the single 
combatant or on a small group of soldiers, but on the tümen, (Russian: t’ma), a unit 
ideally composed of ten thousand men. It was officially recognized that actual tümen 
would be undermanned, for an ‘upper tümen’ was stipulated as having a minimum of 
7000 troops, a middle 5000, and a lower only 3000 (Allsen 1987: 193). The land needed 
to man a tümen was also used by the Mongols as the basic administrative unit.2  
 
In Europe, Mongols are sometimes (and in Russia, always) referred to as Tatars. We do 
not quite know why this is so. According to Matthew Paris, a contemporary who wrote 
interesting about how Europeans reacted to Mongols, it was the French king, Louis XI, 
who punned that the Mongols, who had almost exterminated a neighbouring tribe called 
the Tartars, emanated from hell (Lat. Tartarus), hence Tatars. (Morgan 1986: 57).  
 
The key models on which Chingis Khan organized his Mongol (or Tatar) empire were 
those of the Uigurs and the Khitans. The Uigurs, a neighbouring people that was first to 
be enrolled in the burgeoning empire, was a nomadic turned sedentary people which had 
                                                 
2 In Russia, George Vernadsky (1953: 215-219) has estimated the number of tumens around 1760 to have 
been 27 in the eastern principalities, and an additional 16 in the western ones. These territorial units later 
came to be known as volosti. 
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considerable experience in ruling sedentary populations and cities. The Mongols 
borrowed their alphabet (and used it until about a century ago), their way of setting up a 
chancery and the concept of scribes. The Khitans were a semi-nomadic Turko-Mongolian 
people that had conquered the Chinese in the ninth century, established the Liao dynasty, 
been displaced, and returned as a key steppe force of the twelfth century. The Khitans, 
which were brought into the Mongol fold in 1218, had administered a loose and non-
confessional steppe empire based on tribute extracted by decimally organized cavalry 
(Morgan 1986: 49).3 For this, they had used intermediaries, and these are the direct 
predecessors of the darugha used by the Mongols, the Turkish concept for which is 
basqaq (Morgan 1986: 109). The Mongol intermediaries that ran the Khipchak Khanate 
in Russia in the early decades were locally known as the baskaki. Chinggis’s key tool was 
his imperial guard, which had at its core his classificatory brothers (anda) and people 
who had chose to leave their tribe to follow him personally (nöker). The guard, which 
included representatives of all the Mongolian tribes (‘a useful form of hostage-taking’, 
Morgan 1986: 90 comments), and which was in effect Chinggis’s household, numbered 
around 10.000 at the outset of his conquests.4  
 
The Mongols themselves were almost uniformly illiterate, but they kept written records 
which were usually penned by personnel taken from conquered peoples. Except for  their 
famous “Secret History”, though, there is very little by way of Mongol historiography. 
For obvious reasons, the sedentaries that they conquered have tended to treat them as the 
Other and give them a bad press. One case in point is the Russian standard work on the 
Khipchap Khanate (the Golden Horde of which the Russian lands were part; Grekov and 
Yakubovskiy 1950). It paints a picture of the invasion and the rule which accentuates the 
bloody-mindedness of the Mongols and the sufferings of the inhabitants. 
It was written at a time when Soviet historiography went through a particularly 
nationalistic phase, but is still fairly representative of the literature in Russian, which is 
strong on facts but weak on interpretation (Franklin 2001). Western historians, who may 
build on the facts excavated by Russian colleagues and add their own workmanship, are 
to be preferred The standard work on the Khipchak Chanate remains Spuler (1965). It is a 
good illustration of the general Russian attitude to the world and to historians both that 
when the first edition of this path-breaking work emerged, it was officially criticized by 
the Soviet Union for marginalizing Russians. As Spuler (1963: XIII) dryly responded in 
the preface to the second edition, that was indeed one of the points of writing a history of 
the Mongol state formation of which Russian lands were only one part. 
 
                                                 
3 Beyond the Khitans, there is an uninterrupted tradition of steppe empires reaching back for at least a 
fifteen hundred years. From the perspective of their neighbours to the south, the rise of the Mongol empire 
was a working accident: ‘There was a standard imperial Chinese policy for dealing with them. They would 
be carefully watched, and if one nomadic chief seemed to be gaining power and influence at the expense of 
others, Chinese subsidies, recognition and titles would be offered to one of his rivals, who would be 
encouraged to cut the upstart down to size. Should the new protégé in his turn seem to be becoming 
dangerously powerful, the process would be repeated.’ (Morgan 1986: 35). 
4 ‘The imperial administration was […] essentially an extension of the prince’s household establishment in 
terms of organization, function, and personnel. It is for this reason that the Mongol Empire in general, and 
Möngke’s reign in particular, have a pronounced patrimonial flavor’ (Allsen 1987: 100). 
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Throughout the first half of the 13th century, Mongols had a very clear and explicit 
political ideology, complete with scrupulous rules for how to deal with other political 
entities.5 The key idea was that of a heavenly mandate. Knowing that all the steppe 
empires, from the Hsiung-nu (Huns) in the second century BC and onwards, had adhered 
to the same principle of legitimacy, and given that the Hiung-nu evolved it concurrently 
with Chinese imperial ideology (Barfield 1989; de Rachewiltz 1971: 104), we already 
have the outline of the principle’s genealogy. Nothing has only one origin, however, and 
in this case, too, there may have been a fair amount of hybridization. As Spuler (1969: 5) 
puts it,  
 
Some contribution was no doubt also made by Christian theories of an 
oecumenical church under a single central leadership, since certain Mongol tribes 
had for about two centuries been firm adherents of Nestorian Christianity and had 
thus had access to Christian thought. Insofar as inferences can be drawn when 
direct evidence of contemporary political ideas is lacking, it would seem that a 
peculiar metamorphosis of Christian doctrinal theories into political notions had 
considerable importance in the development of the Mongol concept of world 
empire. 
 
The locus classicus for this discussion is Voegelin (1941: 402), who analysed the 
preambles to extant orders of submission from Mongol khans to European powers as 
‘legal instruments […] attached to the orders of submission in order that the addressees 
might not plead ignorance of Mongol law when they did not obey the orders received’. 
Voegelin (1941: 378) extracted from this material ‘the principal ideas underlying Mongol 
constitutional law, as well as the framework of Mongol political theory’. The key idea is 
the isomorphism between heaven and earth; the former is ruled by God, and the latter 
should be ruled by his servant, the Mongol Khagan. There was, however, a temporal 
problem, for  
 
The true essence of world government is not yet in an actual but only in a 
potential state, and it is bound to materialize itself in the course of history by 
turning the real world of political facts into a true picture of the ideal and essential 
state as visualized by the Order of God […] the Mongols, therefore, cannot 
simply make wat on foreign powers,sicne any legal title is lacking for an 
                                                 
5 The break came in the late 1250s, when the Khipchak Khan, Berke, broke ranks. The Great Khan in 
Karakorum had assigned the Caucasus to Batu’s Khipchak Chanate. The Great Möngke reversed this 
decision, giving it to the rivaling Mongol polity of the Persia-based Il-khans instead. The Caucasus 
remained a bone of contention between the Khipchak Chanate and the Il-khans (and also to their 
successors, the first of whom was Timur-lenk) and mutatis mutandis down to the present era. When 
Möngke died, the struggle over the Caucasus bacame the main factor in determining the Khipchak 
Khanate’s and the Il-khan’s positioning in the succession struggle. The Il-khan candidate (Hülagü) won. 
The leader of the Khipchak Khanate (Berke) answered by taking a step unprecedented in Mongol imperial 
history , namely to forge an alliance with Mamluk Egypt against his fellow Mongols, the Il-khans. The 
1261 alliance was followed up by a commercial treaty which opened up for trade which proved lucrative to 
both sides (basically slaves for luxury gooods). This trade was of utmost importance for the Golden Horde 
until, in 1354, the Ottoman Turks took over control of the Dardanelles from the Byzantines. The Ottoman 
Turks effectively put an end to the Golden Horde’s Egyptian trade (Spuler 1969). 
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enterprise of this sort. The proper mode of procedure for the Imperial Government 
is to send embassies in due form to the powers in question, giving them all the 
necessary information on the principles of Mongol World-Empire law in order 
that they may know that the moment of passing frompotential to actual 
membership has come, and to enable them to take this step in accordance with the 
legal rules which govern it (Voegelin 1041: 403, 405). 
 
In other words, the Khagan was fully aware that there were rulers who did not yet know 
of his existence, but these were nonetheless classified as being in rebellion against the 
Mongol empire to be, under Chingis Khan’s successors, known as the Golden Kin. Allsen 
writes about these political ideas that they 
 
can be traced back to the Türk quaghanate, were in all likelihood transmitted to 
the Mongols by the Uighur Turks. In the Mongol adaptation of this ideological 
system it was held that Eternal Heaven (Möngke Tenggeri), the sky god and the 
chief deity of the [Shamanistic] steppe nomads, bestowed upon Chinggis Qan a 
mandate to bring the entire world under his sway. This grant of universal 
sovereignty gave the Mongols the right, or perhaps more accurately, placed upon 
them the obligation, to subjugate and chastise any nation or people refusing to join 
the Empire of the Great Mongols on a voluntary basis (Allsen 1987: 42). 
 
Chingis Khan had four sons who all left descendents: Jochi, Chaghadai, Ögödei and 
Tolui. Relations between these four lineages were at the centre of Mongol politics. The 
key principle of organization was kinship, both biological kinship and classificatory 
kinship. The language of the fights over succession was the one of the jasagh, the rules of 
the ancestors, which were supposed to be upheld and to which respect should be paid, not 
least when these used were used creatively. Although the custom was for the youngest 
son to follow in his father, when it came to being the khan of khans (khagan), there was 
no automatic succession involved. The candidates built alliances which felt one another 
out until one candidate emerged as the stronger one and called a kurultai where the 
leading Chingisid successors were to consecrate him (Allsen 1987: 34). After Chingis 
Khan died in 1227, his youngest son Tolui took over as regent, but in 1229 it was Ögödei 
who made khagan. When he died in 1241, a protracted fight between the Toluids and the 
Ögödeians ended when Tolui’s oldest son Möngke made khagan in 1251.6 This 
protracted fight was of key importance to European history, and l will return to it below.  
 
Centralization of the empire peaked under Möngke. Within his central administration, he 
established regional secretariats for China, Turkestan, Persia and, although this is not 
altogether clear, Rus’ (Allsen 1987: 101). He recalled all the imperial seals, insignia and 
orders from the court (jarligh) and issued new ones .This gave him a chance to screen all 
the empire’s middle men and all his own residents. He then restricted the availability of 
the vital postal system to these people only. ‘A third measure was intended to 
circumscribe the power of the imperial princes within the confines of their own 
appanages (fen-ti). Thenceforth, these princes could neither summon their subjects on 
                                                 
6 He was followed by his brother Qubilai (Kublai Khan, 1260-1294). Qubilai concentrated on China, and 
was not much of a presence in other parts of what was now increasingly the former Mongol empire.  
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their own authority nor issue any orders concerning financial matters without first 
conferring with officials of the imperial court.’ (Allsen 1987: 80-81)   
 
Möngke dispatched his own people to do the actual tax collection. The local middle man 
was allowed to have his own representative on the spot, but he was not allowed to receive 
the actual taxes. Allsen (1987: 46) notes that 
 
Of particular importance was the qaghan’s right to appoint the Mongol residents, 
called darughachi or basqaq, who were stationed in all major population centers 
and at the courts of all local dynasts. These officials, who commanded wide 
administrative, police, and military powers, were key figures in the control and 
exploitation of the subject populations (Allsen 1987: 46).  
 
A final point that needs underlining in our regard is that ‘The grand qan had exclusive 
right to conduct relations with others on behalf of the empire’ (Allsen 1987: 45). I have 
dwelt on Mongol administration and its historical precondition first, in order to 
demonstrate that the Mongols stood in a long political steppe tradition and second, 
because this was the blueprint for how the Mongols that settled on the Volga from the 
1240s on ruled the Rus’ lands. 
 
The Mongols’ Western campaign 
 
When Chinggis Khan died in 1227, he had not only instructed his sons to conquer the 
world, he had alloted parts that were not yet conquered.7 The extreme West of the 
Mongol empire was the preserve of Jochi, who was also bequeathed 4000 soldiers (Tolui 
inherited the lion’s share, 101.000 men). Jochi had already reconnoitered the lands, and 
established a fledgling polity called the White Horde somewhere north of the Caspian 
Sea. Indeed, in his work on Mongol imperialism, Thomas Allsen maintains that the 1237-
1240 expedition which established the Mongols in the Rus’ lands ‘was designed 
primarily to carve out a territory for the family of Jochi’ (Allsen 1987: 28, comp. 45).  
 
Jochi’s reconnoitering in 1223 had also resulted in first contact between Mongols and the 
Rus’. On their way westward, in 1222, the Mongol reconnoitering party met opposition 
from an alliance of Alan and Khipchak troops.8 When the Mongols proclaimed 
themselves the blood brothers of the Khipchaks, this was enough to break the alliance. 
The Mongols proceeded to massacre the Alans while the Khipchaks stood idly by. Once 
the job was done, the Mongols massacred the Khipchaks. The Khipchak Khan Kotyan 
passed words of what had happened back to his son-in law prince Mstislav of Galicia 
                                                 
7 A correspondence is often assumed between the four sons and the subsequent Mongol-led polities in 
China, Persia, Central Asia and Russia, but as pointed out by Jackson 1999, this is too neat.   
8  The Alans were a Farsi-speaking people (and so by the lights of the day arguably further removed from 
the Mongols than Turkic-speaking peoples like the Khipchaks). Eventually, a large number of them settled 
in Khanbaliq (now Beijing) where they were converted to Christianity by archbishop John of 
Montecorvino. They became a mainstay of the Mongol army. Kagan Toghon Temür sent an embassy to the 
Pope in 1338, asking the Pope to send a new pastor as well as for his blessing. De Rachewiltz (1971: 188) 
sees the key reason for this as being the kagan’s ‘desire to please the military chiefs on whom depended the 
security of the state and the emperor’s own safety’.  
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(note the marriage alliance), who called a council in Kiev. Three princes decided to raise 
an army and engage them on foreign territory. The army marched east, where they were 
met by Mongol envoys whose message was that their real quarrel was with the 
Khipchaks. The Rus’ princes recognized the tactic that they had heard about from the 
Khipchaks themselves, and proceeded to kill the envoys. This move guaranteed that there 
would be war. When it broke, the three Rus’ princes were neither willing nor able to 
coordinate their efforts (which also meant that they could not coordinate very well with 
their Khipchak allies).  
 
The importance of Mongol superior strategy is in evidence already during this first clash 
between the Rus’ and Mongols, which took place at the Kalka river (now in southern 
Ukraine) in 1223, when two of Chengis Khan’s four key generals, Jebe and Subudai, 
outmanoeuvred a badly organized assemblage of Rus’ and Khipchak forces which 
actually outnumbered the Mongols (Allsen 1987: 6). Note that the Western 
reconnoitering played out according to standard Mongol operating procedures: 
 
Prior to the commencement of hostilities with a foreign state (qari-irgen [i.e. 
polity]) the Mongols always issued orders of submission that offered its ruler 
physical and institutional survival in return for acknowledging the suzeraignty 
[sic] of the qaghan. Even if the ruler did not in the end surrender, such offers were 
stilla valuable means of weakening an enemy’s resolve and a diplomatic tool for 
detaching his clients and allies. […] Another and perhaps more compelling reason 
for the toleration of dependent states was the Mongols’ lack of experienced 
administrative personnel. Inasmuch as very few of the Mongols’ estimated 
population of seven hundred thousand were literate and still fewer were familiar 
with the “customs and laws of cities,” retention of a local dynasty and its 
attendant administrative apparatus was frequently the most practical method of 
controlling and exploiting the population and resources of a newly surrendered 
territory (Allsen 1987: 64-65).  
 
The Rus’ princes, seemingly reckoning that the Mongols were simply another steppe 
nuisance, paid no more heed to steppe affairs than before. That was a key mistake. In 
1238, the Mongols returned with a vengeance. For the next two years, they effectively 
overcame all military oppositions from Bolgars, Khipchaks, the Rus’, Poles and 
Hungarians. They established themselves in the Rus’ and Hungarian lands, and had 
scouting parties as far west as Venice and Vienna. Once again, the campaign went 
according to plan. Cities which did not offer resistance were spared, cities that did were 
more or less destroyed. The result, here as elsewhere in the empire, was patchy 
destruction of the conquered areas (Morgan 1986: 82). 
 
There is no reason whatsoever to assume that, if they had forged ahead, the Mongols 
would not have subdued all of what we may anachronistically refer to as Europe and 
made it into part of the Mongol order in one way or the other. As it happened, however, 
news of Ögödei’s death reached the extreme west of the empire in 1241. At this time, not 
only Batu, who was Jochi’s oldest son, but also Ögödei’s oldest son Gülüg and Tolui’s 
oldest son Möngke were there. The presence of three out of four Chingisid lineages was 
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not by chance; the Western front was at this time the key area of new conquest, which 
meant that representatives of the different lineages were there to keep an eye on one 
another. Now, however, it became more important to keep an eye on one another in the 
Mongol heartland around Kharakhorum, where the succession would be decided. In the 
upshot, both Gülüg and Möngke left the Western frontier for the steppes. The focus of 
imperial politics turned away from the fairly narrow strip of land that remained to be 
conquered, namely Europe. This left the Jochids, led by Batu, alone in the West with his 
newly won Rus’ possessions. 
 
Although he was no longer in the thick of imperial politics, as head of one of the four 
Chingisid lineages Batu was a key player in Mongol politics.9 When khagan Ögödei’s 
widow Töregene, who was regent 1241-1246, called a kurultai to consecrate Gülüg as 
new khagan, Batu refused to attend, and when she went on anyway, Batu refused to 
acknowledge the new khagan. This was instrumental in forcing the khaganate off 
Ögödeian hands and usher in the Toluids, and this happened at a kurultai which was 
actually called by Batu. Furthermore, Batu had more leeway vis-à-vis the imperial centre 
than had other regional middle men (Allsen 1987: 61, comp Nexon & Wright 2007). 
Actually, from Möngke’s accession in 1251, ‘Batu was conceded virtual autonomy in his 
own ulus [patronage] of the Golden Horde’ (Morgan 1986: 117).  
 
Note, however, that the first darughachi or governor to the Khipchak Khanate or Golden 
Horde, a Mongol by the name of Kitai, was sent from Kharakhorum in 1257 (Allsen 
1987: 104). Furthermore, Batu and his immediate successors sometimes sent Rus’ princes 
to the Mongol capital of Kharakorum to have their patents of rule confirmed there.10 
Also, under Möngke,  
 
Hostages were an additional measure designed to assure the fidelity of the 
Mongols’ dependent rulers. Carpini reports that all tributaries were required to 
send sons or brothers to the imperial court [at Kharakorum]. As examples, he 
notes that Yaroslav of Vladimir, the chieftain of the Alans, and the Korean king 
had sent relatives as a pledge of their good behavior. […] it was not always the 
possibility of the hostage’s execution that kept a dependent ruler in line, but rather 
the threat of being deposed and replaced by the hostage at the first sign of 
disloyalty (Allsen 1987: 73-74). 
 
When Batu died in 1256, he had built a tent capital in Sarai on the Volga  (100 km north 
of today’s Astrakhan) for his khanate, which came to be known locally as the Golde 
Horde. Batu was followed by his short-lived son (Sartaq, a Christian) and grandson, 
before his brother Berke (1257-1266) took over. Berke lost Georgia to another Chingisid 
line, the Il-khan of Persia, but the overall story of his reign was that he gained more room 
for manoeuvre within the Mongol empire, whose cohesion was now definitely loosening 
(Allsen 1987: 62-63). 
                                                 
9
 Soviet historians like Bartol’d have suggested that Batu was co-ruler, but Allsen (1987: 54-59) and others 
have convincingly refuted the argument. 
10 For example, in 1256-57, Prince Gleb Vasil’kovich of Rostov journeyed to Kharakhorum, and returned 
with a wife, a Mongol princess. (Allsen 1987: 183-184). 
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We have little history writing on the Khipchak Khanate, among other things because its 
archives were destroyed together with most of its city life by Tamerlane’s nomadic 
invading force (emanating from Samarkand) in 1390.11 Since the steppe-dwelling 
Mongols lacked expertise in running administrative apparatuses, throughout the Mongol 
empire these were mostly staffed locally. In the case of the Khipchak Khanate, however, 
there was little by way of local administrative personnel to be found, and so the khagan 
relied on Khwarazm Turks (in Russian Besserminy). Note that its key foreign opponent 
was the Mongol Ilkhans that ruled Persia, and that its key ally was the Egyptian 
Mamluks, who were at loggerheads with the Ilkhans (Vernadsky 1953: 131-132).12 The 
Golden Horde’s main foreign policy focus seems to have been Caucasus (especially 
Azerbaijan), not Russia. The tribute from Russia was important, but the European West 
remained a sideshow throughout the Horde’s existence (Halperin 1983: 250-251). The 
Khipchak Khanate adopted Islam as its official religion under Özbek (1313-1341), in 
conjunction with which they also adopted the Persian administrative diwan system.  
 
Mongols and Rus’ Polities 
 
The Mongols destroyed Kiev and established a new layer of Mongol overlordship to what 
was now becoming a suzerain system of Rus’ cities within an imperial structure – that of 
the Golde Horde. The Khipchak Khanate, which was itself still part of an imperial 
structure, continued to follow the standard operational procedures of Mongol rule. As 
summed up by Allsen, the basic demands that the Mongols imposed on all of their 
sedentary subjects were: ‘(1) the ruler must come personally to court, (2) sons and 
younger brothers are to be offered as hostages, (3) the population must be registered, (4) 
militia units are to be raised, (5) taxes are to be sent in, and (6) a darughachi is to take 
charge of all affairs’ (Allsen 1987: 114). To the Mongols,  
 
the surrender of a foreign state [i.e. polity] was not just an admission of military 
defeat and of political subordination, but a pledge that the surrendering state 
would actively support the Mongols in their plans for further conquest. To fulfill 
this pledge, the surrendered state had to place its entire resources at the disposal 
of the empire, and because a census was needed to identify and utilize these 
resources effectively, the Mongols came to consider submission and the 
acceptance of the census as synonymous acts (Allsen 1987: 124). 
 
A census was made of Kiev in 1245 and of Novgorod in 1259.  
 
Following Mongol standard procedures, the khan initially dispatched baskaki, personal 
representatives, to live in key Rus’ cities. After some decades (how many is not exactly 
                                                 
11 The Golden Horde had been in dynastic crisis since the death of Khan Berdibeg in 1359, one reason 
being that swelling of the numbers of the Golden Kin; Spuler 1965: vol. II). The object of the invasion was 
Khan Tokhtamesh (1376-1395), a previous protégé of Tamerlane’s who succeeded in uniting the Golden 
Horde with the White Horde to its east. The White Horde had been established by the same Mongol 
campaign that spied out the Russian lands in 1223. 
12 Indeed, balance of power logic then suggested a potential for Ilkhanite alliances with Christian polities. 
Such prospects were tested out at a number of occasions, but remained fruitless. 
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known), the Mongols changed their policy and dispatched representatives who were 
based in the capital Saray on shorter inspections (darugi). The Rus’ called these posoli 
(posly is still the term for ambassadors in Russian). When the posoly were not on 
missions, they worked in the administration in Saray (Halperin 1987: 33). In the degree 
that there remained a primus inter pares amongst the Rus’ princes, it was the grand 
prince of Vladimir. His rule, like that of all princes, was dependent on a Mongol patent 
(yarlik). The principle of personal presence was replayed on the regional level, which 
meant that Rus’ princes journeyed to Sarai in person to deliver their pledges of loyalty. 
The Rus’ probably paid their taxes partly in coin, partly in furs. 
 
In Rus’ lands as elsewhere under the Mongols, there was one group that did not pay 
taxes. That was religious leaders, which in Christian areas meant the clergy. A 
precondition of this special treatment was Mongol eclectic religious tastes and general 
tolerance. Exemption from taxes were also a useful political tool which facilitated 
breaking in local religious elites to imperial rule. In Russia as elsewhere, this came in 
handy.13 The clergy were, it will be remembered, a force in the squabbling between 
lineages in Russia, and this squabbling went on unabated after the Mongol invasion. As 
Fennell (1983: 97) puts it, ‘the princes were able to squabble amongst themselves, to 
manage their own business, to defend themselves against enemies in the west, and even 
occasionally to interfere in the affairs of their old neighbours in the south’. 
 
The ‘Vsevolodskiys’, whose struggles converged on the city of Vladimir and its 
hinterland (Suzdalia), were the main lineage in Russia after the Mongol invasion. After 
Kiev’s fall, it was Vladimir which was the key Rus’ city. The Vsevolodskliys were 
named after Yuriy Dolgorukiy’s son Vsevolod III, whose son Yaroslav’s sons included 
Aleksander Nevskiiy and Andrey. They were, not surprisingly, split on the key question 
of whether to cooperate with the Mongol invader or to cooperate with their neighbours to 
the West. This was a struggle for keeps, in the sense that the winner would maintain the 
throne for his direct descendants (primogeniture having become the key principle of 
succession in the years immediately preceding the Mongol invasion). Furthermore, since 
Galicia was already attempting to head Westwards and the southern cities were 
increasingly passive politically, it was also a struggle about the entire orientation of what 
remained the key areas of the Rus’ lands and was increasingly becoming the only centre 
of political gravity between the Khipchak Khanate in the east and Hungary, Poland, 
Lithuania, the Germans and the Scandinavians in the west. It was a centre that was very 
aware of its dependence on their new Mongol overlords. Between 1242 and 1252, 
Suzdalian princes made nineteen visits to the Saray. Four of these visits ended with the 
princes being sent on to the Mongol capital Kharakorum (Fennell 1983: 99).14 
 
                                                 
13 ‘For example, Cyril, the Metropolitan of Kiev, who at first supported the anti-Mongol princes of Galicia 
and Volynia, in the end (1252) threw his considerable weight behind Alexander Nevsky, the prince of 
Novgorod and champion of accomodation’ (Allsen 1987: 122). 
14 Since one of the points I am trying to make is that Europe’s Eastern frontier is a hybrid, it should be 
pointed out that the boundary just drawn is also in need of dedifferentiation. For example, Mongol power 
resulted in ‘a revival of the old steppe traditions at the court of Hungary’ in the latter half of the 13 th 
century (Vernadsky 1953: 180-181). 
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Given Mongolian superior military force, the temptation to embrace the inevitable and 
collaborate must have been very strong indeed. The key bandwagoner was Aleksander 
Nevskiy. Already in the early years of the Mongol invasion, Aleksander had spent the 
time successfully fighting Swedish detachments (1240, earning his moniker) and German 
Knights (1242). These fights were part of a protracted struggle for mastery over the lands 
lying between them. When Yaroslav died in 1248, Aleksander was next in line of 
succession, but it was his younger brother Andrey who seized the throne. Andrey was one 
of the few Rus’ princes to advocate resistance to the Mongols. Nonetheless, in order to 
hang on to the throne, he needed the patent from the Khan, so both he, and eventually his 
brother Alexander, made their way first to Saray, and then onwards to Kharakorum, 
where Andrey was confirmed in Vladimir and Alexander in Kiev. Since Vladimir had 
been the main prize since the Tatar invasion, Aleksander did not rest content with this 
decision, and in 1252 he went to the Horde and obtained their help to oust Andrey. 
Andrey fled to Sweden. Aleksander had managed to put paid not only to his brother 
Andrey, but to organized opposition to the Mongols as such. As Fennell (1983: 108) puts 
it, 
 
this was the end of any form of organized opposition to the Tatars by the rulers of 
Russia for a long time to come. It was the beginning of Russia’s real subservience 
to the Golden Horde […] the so-called ‘Tatar Yoke’ began not so much with 
Baty’s [i.e. Batu’s] invasion of Russia as with Aleksander’s betrayal of his 
brothers. 
 
From this time on, the enrollment of Mongol backing became a routine part of 
internecine struggles. There was nothing new about this: first the nomadic Pechenegs and 
then the Khipchaks had been drawn on in similar fashion by the Rus’ princes before. 
Now, once more, the appeal to steppe forces became a key factor in the intensification of 
direct Mongol control with Rus’ political life. There is a causal link between this 
development and the period of intensified Mongol raids and invasions towards the end of 
the thirteenth century. At this point, not only were Mongols from the Khipchak Khanate 
brought in, Rus’ princes who were up against other Rus’ princes with Horde backing 
actually ventured further field to bring in the backing of Mongols insurgents from the 
Nogay further south.15  Rus’ princes stood against Rus’ princes, each backed by a 
Mongol ally. 
 
In 1304, the grand prince of Vladimir died. Three developments brought about a change 
in politics. First, the princes of Moscow and Tver’ emerged as the key players in Rus’ 
politics, among other things as a result of their population increase in the wake of the 
Mongol invasion, which was again to do with nice strategic location (with Moscow in 
particular being something of a hub of the river system).16 Secondly, among other things 
                                                 
15 The Nogay, named after the Mongol Nogay Khan, based in the Caucasus around present-day Kalmykia 
and harbouring a number of Khipchaks, were at loggerheads with the rest of the Golden Horde in the 
1290s, and established themselves as a khanate in 1319. They ’built a power base in the Crimea and the 
Balkans and contested with the khans of the lower Volga for control of the Golden Horde’ (Halperin 1987: 
18). 
16 The two other cities to be ruled by Grand Dukes, Nizjniy Novgodor and Riazan, came up short on both 
counts.  
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because of the now firmly established principle of primogeniture, these princes headed 
more clearly organized families, which served as a firm power base. Thirdly, the firm 
wedding between families and cities meant that the territoriality of this power base was 
now assured in a much higher degree than before.17 Following decades of struggle 
between Moscow and Tver’, Moscow emerged victorious and Ivan I was granted the title 
of grand prince of Vladimir by the Mongols in 1328. From Ivan I onwards, Moscow was 
the emergent centre of gravity of Rus’ politics, and the home both of the great prince 
(who underlined his success by adding ‘and of all Russia’ to his princely title) and of the 
Metropolitan. Moscow remained completely dependent on the Mongols, however, to the 
point that brothers appealed to Saray and even traveled there in order to settle their 
succession struggles (Halperin 1987: 58). Moscow took its time fighting down Tver’ 
competition. In 1353, Novgorod supported the Tver’ bid for the grand principality of 
Vladimir over the Moscow one by sending envoys to Saray to plead for Tver’s case 
(Halperin 1987: 51).  
 
The grand princes of Moscow kept up their brilliance in playing the alliance game. 
Whereas Tver’ looked West, to the rising power of Lithuania. Moscow stuck to the 
Mongols of the Khipchak Khanate. This served them well, for they were able to stave off 
three attacks by Lithuania and Tver’ between 1368 and 1372. As summed up by Halperin 
(1987: 54; for details, see Vernadsky 1953: 207), 
 
the special relationship between the Golden Horde and Moscow was strengthened 
in the middle of the fourteenth century, when the Mongols faced a new challenge 
to their hegemony. Grand prince Olgerd of Lithuania struck deep into the Tatar 
orbit by bringing both Tver’ and Riazan’ into his sphere of influence and applying 
pressure to Novgorod.18 Olgerd’s opposition to Moscow was not rooted in 
principle, and he played politics by the same rules as everyone else. Thus, with 
the eye on Moscow, he sent a delegation to the Golden Horde to negotiate a 
rapprochement.  The Mongols, however, had decided, logically, to use Moscow as 
a counterweight to the growing power of Lithuania. The Muscovites were 
therefore successful in their attempts to undermine the Lithuanian embassy, and 
the Mongols, in a fine display of political delicacy, arrested the Lithuanian envoys 
and handed them over to Moscow. Olgerd was compelled to ransom his 
emissaries from his enemies. 
 
The decisive Moscow victory over Tver’ occurred in 1375.19 In 1478, Ivan III subdued 
Novgorod. Moscow owed its victory to the superior way in which they had played the 
                                                 
17 Vernadsky (1953: 167), whose major thesis throughout his multi-volume history is the rise of Russian 
nationhood (preceded by a ‘federal’ Kievan state period), nonetheless stresses how Alexander’s brothers’ 
and sons’ failing to settle in Vladimir upon becoming its Grand Duke constituted ‘the temporary victory of 
the apanage (udel) principle over that of the nation state’.   
18 From the 1250s onwards Galicia and Kiev came ever closer to the Lithuanian kingdom, and were 
eventually absorbed by it. The Russian aristocracy asserted themselves strongly , however, to the point that 
a variant of Russian (White Russian) became the kingdom’s official language. A number of nobles 
eventually gravitated back to Muscovy, cf. Backus 1957. 
19 Tver’ did not give up, though. In 1382, it allied with Khan Tokhtamesh of the Golden Horde against 
Moscow.  
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alliance game vis-à-vis the Mongols compared to other Rus’ polities. From this time on, 
in order to underline how Moscow was changing the suzeraign system of Rus’ lineages 
into a polity centred on Moscow, it is customary to refer to this polity as Muscovy. 
Muscovy was still subservient to the Khipchak Khanate, and would remain so for another 
hundred years.  
 
In terms of systems logic, the arrival of Lithuania was a major event, since it challenged 
the suzeraign system by adding another possible centre of gravity for Rus’ princes. It is 
true that Lithuania was at first sucked into the suzeraign system centering on the 
Khipchak Khanate’s ambit, in the degree that the Khipchak Khanate certainly saw 
Lithuania as a vassal, and Lithuania itself at some point probably did (comp. Vernadsky 
1953: 264). It is also true that the Khipchak Khanate backed Moscow in its war with 
Lithuania in 1406, and also at subsequent occasions. As the Khipchak Khanate weakened 
and Moscow as well as Lithuania emerged ever stronger, however, diplomatic relations 
between the Khipchak Khanate and Lithuania became closer and also less lop-sided. 
Despite certain temporary set-backs such as the Moscow-Lithuanian treaty of friendship 
of 1449 (a short-lived affair anyway), the Khipchak Khanate and Lithuania were more 
often than not at one on opposing the rise of Moscow.20 It was an alliance that did not 
fulfil the goal for which it was formed, however, for Moscow (which could in turn draw 
on its good relations with the emergent Crimean khanate)21 emerged triumphant, whereas 
the Khipchak Khanate fell apart. Note, and this is crucial in our context, that the patterns 
of alliance do not follow religious or cultural lines. The same may be said about the 
alliance Muscovy and what was left of the Khipchak Khanate formed in 1502, against the 
Great Horde, i.e. the polity of nomadic Mongol-led forces on the steppe.  
 
To sum up, the key political fact in the Rus’ lands from 1240 to the end of the 15th 
century was the suzerainty of the Mongols, based in Saray. Rus’ princes fought one 
another, and used Mongol backing as the key power resource in their internecine 
struggles. The Mongols lent their support to various princes with a view to upholding 
tribute. They also followed the same policy towards the Rus’ princes that they themselves 
and other steppe peoples had experienced from the Chinese side: they played the Rus’ 
princes off one another so that no one of them should emerge as a uniting force that could 
                                                 
20 The fifteenth-century political cabal in these parts turned on a familiar alliance pattern. In the East, the 
Golden Horde strove to hang onto its suzerainty in Russian lands, which were increasingly dominated by 
Muscovy. In the South, the Crimean Khanate tried to stem the increasing influence of the Russians on the 
Golden Horde. In the west, the Lithuanians tried to encroach on Russian lands. Logically, an basic alliance 
pattern emerged whereby the Golden Horde and Muscovy paired up against Lithuania and the Crimean 
Khanate. Once the Golden Horde unraveled, there was elite integration. During Russia’s Time of Troubles, 
the Tatar aristocracy rallied to the Russian cause against the Poles. The Tatar aristocracy was placed side 
by side with the Russian one in 1784 (Spuler 1969: 91). The Crimean Tatars was had a rather different end 
of it. Their final raid on Moscow, in 1571, ended with them actually being able to the Muscovites assenting 
to paying tribute, but that tribute never seems to have been paid. Once the hetman Bogdan Khielnitski 
transferred his loyalties from Poland to Russia in 1654, the Poles and the Crimean Tatars once again made 
common cause against Russia. The Crimean Tatars remained a potential ally for Russia’s opponents until 
they was incorporated into Russia after the Russian victory over the Ottomans in 1774. 
21 This is not to say that the relationship between Muscovy and this second most long-lived of the Golden 
Horde’s successor states was not volatile. The Crimean Tatars burnt Moscow to the ground as late as in 
1571. 
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challenge Mongol rule. As the Khipchak Khanate started to fall apart from the mid-
fifteenth century onwards, however, Moscow was nonetheless able to emerge as the key 
political centre, which proceeded to relativise Mongol suzerainty and, using techniques 
lent from the Mongols, unite first the Rus’ lands and then the old lands of the Khipchak 
Khanate (Kappeler 2001). Muscovy seems to have stopped paying tribute to the 
Khipchak Khanate some time around 1470, and made an alliance with the Eastern part of 
what was left of it in 1502. Muscovy effectively swallowed its partner, and in 1507, 
Sigismund of Poland-Lithuania was ‘granted’ the Western part from its last Khan. The 
Khipchak Khanate was no more.  
 
Although the fact that the Khipchak Khanate turned to Islam in the first half of the 
fourteenth century could not fail to delineate them clearly from a population who was 
consistently referred to by its writing layer as ‘the Christians’, a number of hybridizing 
practices were in evidence. There was intermarriage, but it was in a high degree an elite 
phenomenon. Spuler (1969: 86) sums it up as follows in the fashion of high modernity: 
‘A fair measure of Finnish blood was absorbed into the veins of the Tatar nation, and 
Russian and Polish captives of both sexes added a certain Slavic element, though the 
Russian contribution was in all probability still very small in the mid 15th century’. More 
importantly, after more than 250 years of Mongol influences, there was widespread 
hybridization on the institutional and practical levels. How widespread is a matter of 
debate, most recently around the publication of a book by Donald Ostrowski (1998). 
Halperin (2000) lays outlines the broad consensus as follows: 
 
Despite the objections of hypersensitive Russian historians, there is a compelling 
case that Muscovy did indeed borrow a variety of Mongol political and 
administrative institutions, including the tamga, the seal for the customs tax as 
well as the tax itself; the kazna, the treasury; the iam, the postal system; tarkhan, 
grants of fiscal or juridical immunity; and den’ga for money. ;uscovite 
bureaucratic practices, including the use of stolbtsy, scrolls to preserve 
documents, and perhaps some feature of Muscovite bureaucratic jargon, may also 
derive from the Qipchaq Khanate, as well as selective legal practices such as 
pravezh, beating on the shins. Certainly Muscovite diplomatic norms for dealing 
with steppe states and peoples were modeled on Tatar ways. Finally, the 
Muscovites had no choice but to study Tatar military tactics and strategies, if only 
to survive by countering them in battle, but the Muscovites also copied Mongol 
weapons, armaments, horse equipage, and formations. 
 
 
The consensus does not extend to the administrative system as such. Ostrowski (1998, 
2000) sees the major aristocratic organ, the Boyar Duma, as being formatted on the major 
aristocratic organ of the Khipchak Khanate, and also sees a number of detailed 
similarities between the lower ranks, but has not been able to garnish much support ffor 
this view (Halperin 2000, Goldfrank 2000). Be that as it may, the pride that Russians took 
in being the key successor of the Khipchak Khanate was evident in the sixteenth century 
aristocratic fashion for tracing one’s ancestry back to Mongols (Halperin 1987: 113). 
Goldfrank (2000: 261) is also bordering on scholarly consensus when he agrees with 
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Ostrowski that ‘the continuous influx of Tatars into Muscovy, the service of Mongol 
tsarevichi in the high political posts, and the marriages between elite Mongols and 
Muscovites Vasilii III and Ivan IV provide sufficient indication of a favorable secular 
orientation towards friendly Tatars’ and reminds us of the importance of Tatar farmer 
immigration to the Novgorod area. As we shall see, this Russian identification with its 
former sovereigns proved to be detrimental to its relations with its European neighbours.  
 
Relevance for Russian-European Relations 
 
Throughout the Mongol period in Russian history, relations with Western Christendom 
continued. The Khipchak Khanate cherished trade, and gave privileges to a number of 
traders. Most of the trade went through the Black Sea, and was handled by non-Mongol 
servants of the Khan. The Mongols were generally very good at acknowledging their 
limited knowledge of city ways, seafaring and other pursuits foreign to the steppe. Seeing 
the advantages of trade with the known world, they therefore employed foreign subjects 
as customs officers, and allowed colonies of Genoese and also Venetian traders along the 
Northern coast of the Black Sea (seeing to it that some ports remained in Tatar hands). 
From 1365 to 1475, when the Crimean Turks put an end to their presence, the Genoese 
dominated heavily (Meyerdorff 1961). In the early years, the Khipchak Khanate 
demanded tribute of the Venetians, but, presumably finding this to be counter-productive, 
soon rescinded the practice (Spuler 1963: 399). Trading included a whole gamut of 
goods, and also slaves. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the invasion, and despite Aleksander Nevskiy’s skepticism 
to Western powers and to Catholicism, pope Innocent IV nonetheless forwarded a Bull to 
him in 1248 (Fennell 1983: 122n15). Rome followed what was going on in the Rus’ 
lands. Note also that Alexander’s ally, Metropolitan Kirill, established a bishopric in 
Saray in 1261. The church’s presence in Saray secured, among other things, a channel 
from the Rus’ clergy and princes to the Byzantine empire, which had diplomatic relations 
with the Khipchak Khanate (the Byzantine emperor married off his daughter to Khan 
Uzbeg of the Golden Kin around 1330; Vernadsky 1953: 196). The Khipchak Khanate 
also received diplomatic envoys from Rome. Even in the immediate aftermath of the 
invasion, ‘trade with the West, either from or via Novgorod and Smolensk, both of which 
suffered no damage from the Tatars, seems to have been relatively unaffected’ (Fennell 
1983: 89). Furthermore, the Khipchak Khanate granted tax exemptions to the Hanseatic 
League, which continued its brisk trade with Rus’ lands via Novgorod (Halperin 1987: 
81).  
 
In 1270, the Khipchak Khanate also made a trade agreement with Riga Germans and 
other Germans, and saw to it that Russian princes did not interfere with it. The main route 
for this trade followed the “Tatar road” from Kiev to Lemberg. Kiev, the main Russian 
town, was “teeming with Tatar, German, Armenian and Moscow merchants (Spuler 
1963: 403). In the context of this book, the main point here is that the boot was firmly on 
the Tatar foot when it came to settle the conditions for and terms of trade here, much as 
they were where the other European-non-European relations discussed in this book are 
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concerned. Note here that Genovese and also particularly Venetian merchants were able 
to draw on these experiences when it came to evolving trade with the Ottoman Empire.  
 
If the existence of and human status of Russian-speakers were known to most Europeans, 
the same could not be said about the steppe-dwelling peoples to their East. Ever since 
Pope Alexander III’s personal physician Master Philip has set sail Eastward from Venice 
in 1177 on his mission to find the alleged Christian kingdom of Prester John,  attempts to 
establish contact had rested on ‘a strange combination of Christian and pagan elements 
[…built on] the legends and myths inherited from the classical world’ (de Rachewiltz 
1971: 29). When the Pope had word of the Mongol invasion some sixty-odd years later, 
his reaction was to send friars with letters asking the Khans to mend his ways and convert 
to Christendom. The Mongol answers mirrored these messages by insisting that the Pope 
should come and pay his respect to the Great Khan. Universal claim stood against 
universal claim (Dawson 1955, Bowden 2009). The envoys to the Great Khans brought 
back new information which made for much more detailed representations in the West of 
people and life in the East.22 However, when both the Ilhanite state and the Khipchak 
Khanate first converted to Islam and then, later in the fourteenth century, went through 
periods of internal strife, it affected the possibility for European missionaries and 
merchants to take the land route through these areas in order to reach destinations further 
East. As a result, direct contacts between the European Continent and the East suffered, 
and European Continental representations of the East were once again dominated by 
‘dreaming and speculation’, as de Rachewiltz (1971: 207) puts it. What this meant was 
that, when Muscovy emerged, Western rulers did not know what to expect. Already in 
1481, Emperor Frederick III addressed an appeal on behalf of the Germans in Livonia to 
Poland and Lithania, Sweden and the Hanseatic Cities about this noted but known entity 
(Halecki 1952: 8). Direct contacts between Muscovy and the Holy Roman Emperor 
ensued in 1486, after two and a half centuries of Mongol rule.  
 
In the early 1500s, Russians themselves were far from certain about what to make of their 
Mongol connection. There was a duality in the Russian knowledge production about 
these relations which goes to the heart of how Russo-Mongol relations are relevant to 
Russia’s entry into the European state system. On the one hand, as has been demonstrated 
convincingly by Charles Halperin, Russian contemporary sources, both the chronicles 
paid for by princes as well as literary genres such as the byliny (folk songs), finessed a 
technique of not touching on the fact of Mongol suzerainty directly. As Halperin (1987: 
8, comp. 63) puts it, 
 
The Russian ‘bookmen’ (writers, redactors, scribes, copyists) of the Kievan past 
were accustomed to explaining Russian victories and defeats in skirmishes with 
nomads as signs of God’s pleasure or displeasure with his people. They had never 
                                                 
22 Janet Abu-Lughod’s interesting attempt to theorise the world system before European hegemony is 
marred by her specious readings of these reports. Although she herself notes that their use of imagery is of 
the same kind (and frequently even parading the same specific ideas about monsters and strange 
humanoids) as contemporary Chinese texts about Western lands, she does not hesitate to heap scorn on  
leading European scholars of the period like William of Rubruck (Abu-Lughod 1989: 162, comp. 
Rubruquis 1990). 
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been called upon, however, to rationalize absolute conquest. Instead of 
confronting the ideologically awkward fact of utter defeat, the bookmen finessed 
the fact of Mongol conquest by presenting Russo-Tatar relations as merely a 
continuation of Kievan relations with the steppe with no change of suzereignty 
involved. Thus the Russian bookmen raised the ideology of silence to a higher 
level and threw a veil over the intellectual implications of Mongol hegemony. 
 
However, once the Mongols seemed to be a spent force, there was a need to tell a story 
about Russia’s history as having some kind of continuity. A solution that lay close to 
hand was to forge a new role for the Russian leader as being not only a great prince, but a 
tsar. The problem was that the term tsar was a translation into Russian not only of the 
Greek term basileus (i.e. Byzantine emperor), but also of khan. The implication of these 
eponymous translations was that these two entities were treated on a par. Note that the 
fall of Constantionople is at this point half a century back. There was no longer a basileus 
in Constantinople. The hegemon to live down was the khan in Saray. Vassilian, bishop of 
Rostov and a close advisor of Ivan III, came up with an answer to this problem, namely 
to raise the status of Ivan III to that of tsar and so live down the very idea that there was 
ever such a thing as a tsar in Saray. The link should be that of basileus to tsar, and the 
khan should be treated as nothing but an impostor (see Cherniavsky [1959] 1970). 
 
However, there is an interesting split in representations of Muscovite rule here, for as I 
have tried to demonstrate above, once the domestic work of establishing the basic 
continuation of Russia’s legitimacy as a Christian power was done, Muscovy actually 
started propping up its claims to being an imperial power on a par with the Holy Roman 
Empire by invoking its conquests of the successors states of the Khipchak Khanate, 
notably Kazan’ and Astrakhan.23 In a situation where Europeans knew little of Mongol or 
even Asian ways (little, not nothing: there had, after all, been continuous contacts), 
Russia chose to base its claims for recognition partly on its Mongol connection. This 
move flowed from hybridization, and the self-evident way in which Muscovites 
performed the move goes to show how this hybridization had become doxic (not least, 
one would suspect, because there was now little to fear from the former overlords). 
Muscovy’s opting for a Mongol translation imperii was clearly detrimental to the 
Russian polity’s relations with Europe, where Mongols were remembered as clear-cut 
barbarians. Even as late as in the early 1800s, when Napoleon’s propaganda machine 
needed anti-Russian slurs, one of those that really caught on was ‘Grattez le russe et vous 
trouverez le tatare!’ (Scratch a Russian and find a Tatar; Halperin 1987: ix). This saying 
is not without substance, however. An example from everyday life may be the Russian 
taboo against shaking hands across thresholds. A ritual example of the lingering 
importance of hybridization today may be found in that key object of anthropological 
inquiry, burial rites. In addition to the standard funeral, Russians come together 40 days. 
The religious explanation for this is to do with shadowing the Ascension; the deceased 
dear ones congregate to ease the soul’s passing to heaven. Note that this is a common 
practice amongst Muslims, but not so amongst other Christians. An example which is key 
to International relations concerns the restrictions imposed on movements by diplomats 
                                                 
23 As late as the seventeenth century, the emigré Muscovite bureaucrat Gregorii Kotoshikin explained that 
the ruler of Muscovy was a tsar’ by virtue of Ivan IV’s conquest of Kazan’’; Halperin 1987: 100. 
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which was in evidence continuously from the Mongol period and until the fall of the 
Soviet Union, a shadow of which remains even today. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Rus’ should be categorized as a suzeraign system of polities centered on Kiev, rather than 
as a single polity. The polities were lineages led by princes. Neighbouring powers, 
including steppe-dwelling peoples, were brought into the fight between lineages on a 
regular basis. Once the Mongols destroyed Kiev in 1240 and established a new layer of 
Mongol overlordship, this loose suzeraign system of lineage-based polities characterized 
by a high level of conflict and open lines to allies from the adjacent steppe became part of 
an imperial structure – that of the Golde Horde. For some decades afterwards, the 
Khipchak Khanate was itself still part of an imperial structure. The Khipchak Khanate 
ruled Rus’ according to standard operational Mongol procedures. At the beginning of the 
fourteenth century, two lineages, now thoroughly territorialized in the cities of Moscow 
and Tver’, fought for predominance amongst the Rus’. Moscow owed its victory to the 
superior way in which they had played the alliance game vis-à-vis the Mongols compared 
to other Rus’ polities. From the 1370s on, in order to underline how Moscow was 
changing the suzeraign system of Rus’ lineages into a polity centred on Moscow, it is 
customary to refer to this polity as Muscovy. Muscovy was still subservient to the 
Khipchak Khanate, and would remain so for another hundred years, until the Golde 
Horde fell apart in the first decade of the 1500s. 
 
As Mongol suzeraignty waned, relations with steppe polities nonetheless continued. 
When, in the early decades of the 15th century, rival Mongol khans were not able to 
maintain order amongst the local Tatar princes of the Dniepr steppes, some of which 
formed semi-independent detachments that became known as Cossacks. Vitautas of 
Lithuania hired some of them to man the steppe frontier. Slavs that were similarly 
employed also came to be known as Cossacks (Vernadsky 1953: 289). When, in the 
1440s, Moscow decided to resettle the Tatars that had joined its Grand Duke’s service, 
‘the best solution seemed to be to establish a network of advance posts along the southern 
border of Russia, close enough to the Tatar-controlled steppes so that Russia’s military 
leaders could both watch the movements of the Tatars and repulse them when they came’ 
(Vernadsky 1953: 331, comp. 320). A former khan’s son, Kasim, had a claim on a 
particular stretch of the frontier around the town of Gorodets, and so in 1452-1453 
Moscow created a separate polity for him there. Gorodets was renamed Kasimov upon 
Kasim’s death in 1471, and went on to become a separate khanate which survived until 
1681, and were Muscovy’s vassals and served ‘primarily as nomadic auxiliary troops’ 
(Halperin 1987: 109). By then, Muscovy had annexed all the Khipchak Khanate’s 
successor states. As was demonstrated most recently by the key role played by Russian 
federal subjects such as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan during the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union (Neumann 1999: 183-206), successors of those successor states are still a distinct 
presence in Russian politics. Through the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it was 
fashionable for Russian aristocratic families to sport their Mongol connections. After 
Peter the Great’s reforms,  with the fading of the Crimean Khanate, which was the 
Khipchak Khanate’s principal successor state in cultural terms, and with Russia’s 
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increasing  Siberian expansion, the Tatar experience took on a more and more 
subterranean role in Russian historiography. The role of the Tatar and also of other 
identities such as the Kalmyk (successors of a specific Mongolian tribe) to present 
Russian national identity awaits further study, but there has certainly been ample 
hybridization. Tatars, Kalmyks, Bashirs and other groups whose collective memory is 
tied up with having been part of the Khipchak Khanate remain liminal to Russian 
identity. 
 
The Mongol connection and hybrid character of the polity of Muscovy coloured Russian 
entry into the European states system. Muscovy itself chose to seek recognition from the 
Continental European powers, with whom connections increased steadily in the fifteenth 
century and after the fall of the Mongol Khipchak Khanate, as successors to that Khanate. 
The bid for recognition was presented by dint of a number of practices that were taken 
directly from the Mongols. Continental European powers were therefore warranted in 
seeing Muscovy as a partly Asian polity.  
 
It should also be clear, however, that the political logic of what was going on in the 
North, between Scandinavians, Lithuanians, Poles, Germans, the Rus’, the Khipchaks etc. 
was one where confession had importance, but not necessarily overwhelming importance. 
It is simply not the case that an overarching polity, be that Christendom or its successor 
Europe, stood against other polities. Neither is it the case that the Continental European 
powers imposed a ready-made system of interaction on Muscovy (or on other 
Northerners, for that matter). It is very hard to identify a clear geographical, social or 
political boundary between Europe and non-Europe in the period under discussion here. 
Rus’ politics before the Mongol intervention had interaction with steppe polities as one of 
their defining traits from the very beginnings in the 8th century.  
 
I have argued that the area called Rus’ that the Mongol forces subdued at the end of the 
1230s was a loose suzeraign system of lineage-based polities characterized by a high 
level of conflict and open lines to allies from the adjacent steppe. I have also argued that 
the establishment of a Mongol imperial order centered on the Golden Horde and lasting 
for around 250 years meant that when Muscovy emerged as the Golden Horde’s self-
acknowledged successor polity, it was as a hybrid polity whose state institutions and 
diplomatic practices bore deep marks of its steppe heritage. Furthermore, Muscovy’s 
emergence came among other things as a result of a century of alliance politics where the 
principal actors were the Golden Horde, Muscovy and Lithuania (Lithuania/Poland).  
 
There are a couple of lessons to be drawn here. First, the editors are right to point out in 
their introduction that we should not think of the past as being culturally homogenous. 
From the 220s before our era, steppe relations were about building up multiethnic 
empires, which sustained themselves among other things by attacking sedentary polities 
to its south; China, Persia, the Byzantine Empire etc. If, as in the fourth century, a steppe 
empire had no luck in China, it could regroup and attempt a devastating attack on the 
Roma empire instead. As a result of all the ensuing hybridization, of which Russia is a 
key example, there simply is little or no cultural ground on which to found a dividion of 
the world into discrete civilizations (cf. Bowden 200). 
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A second lesson to be drawn concerns the status of nomadism in world history. Barry 
Hindess (2000: 1494) has noted about present-day migration discourse how 
 
The assumption here is that, even if they move around within it, people will 
normally be settled in the society to which they belong […] In fact, the historical 
record suggests a different story; namely, that large-scale population movement is 
as normal a feature of the human condition as is long-term territorial settlement… 
Nevertheless, the system of territorial states and the techniques of population 
management developed within it have turned the movement of people around the 
world into an exceptional activity, something that can and should be regulated by 
the states whose borders they threaten to cross (Hindess 2000: 1494). 
 
This is certainly so. All European peoples (with a possible exception for the Basques) 
hail from the steppes, and it took millennia before there was any meaningful distinction 
to be ade before the two. Let us not forget that the first occurrence of the concept of 
Europe in mediaeval history hails from the crowning of Charles the Great in the year 800. 
He crowned himself emperor amongst other things to celebrate his victory over the 
Avars, a steppe people. In a very real sense, the Russian experience with the steppe is an 
historical  coda of the European experience with the steppe. 
 
A third point goes to the core of this volume. In a European comparative perspective, 
with the exception of the Balkans, Russian experiences with non-Europeans were 
particularly long-lasting, and they included 250 years of suzerainty. In a global 
comparative perspective, if we juxtapose Russian-Mongol relations with the European-
non-European relations which were to follow in the early modern period and which are 
the topic of the other chapters in this book, the similarities are overwhelming. Even more 
interestingly is the fact that Russians, the fact that they were Christian notwithstanding, in 
many ways came to be Othered in the very same way as (other?) non-Europeans in that 
period. I have discussed this topic at some length elsewhere (Neumann 1996, 1999). 
Suffice it to point out that the roots of critical development theory are to be found in the 
writings of a Russian Jew, namely Leo Trotsky. It was his reading of Russia’s 
development as ‘combined and uneven’ in a world dominated by (Western) Europeans 
that formed the template on which intellectuals in other parts of the world began to 
theorise development. In the degree that there is a line to be drawn from critical 
development theory to post-colonial scholarship, and in the degree that this book 
embodies the former, the structural parallels between Russ-European relations on the one 
hand, and Chinese-European, African-European, Latin American-Euroepan etc. relations 
on the other have their counterparts in the knowledge production about these relations in 
Russia on the one hand, and other countries such as China, India, Turkey, Persia, Algeria, 
Brazil etc. on the other. 
 
I noted above a propagandist put-down from the court of Napoleon: ’scratch a Russian 
and find a Tatar’. There is nothing empirically wrong with this statement. Russian culture 
is a thoroughly hybridised phenomenon. What is wrong with this slogan is the modernist 
preconditions that lend it its negative propagandistic force, namely that hybridisation is 
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bad. That value judgement was not predominant in the world before the arrival of the 
anarchical society. It is likely to be buried together with the modernity of which it was 
such a characteristic part.  
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